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1Presentation of the book by Antoine Garapon & Ioannis Papadopoulos,
Juger en Amérique et en France. Culture juridique française et common law
(Judging in America and in France : French Legal Culture and Common Law), 
Paris, Odile Jacob, 2003
Ioannis Papadopoulos
This book is the fruit of a basic idea, namely that comparative law is meaningless 
if it is regarded as the sole study of juxtaposed legal systems, regardless of their cultural
dimension.  The book’s main aim is to identify and analyze the basic cultural differences 
between the two great legal traditions of the West, the Continental and the Anglo-
American one, through a thorough examination of the trial, and of judicial institutions 
more widely, as these are organized in France and the United States.  For that purpose, 
after an introduction to the concept of legal culture and the basic notions of the common 
law legal tradition, we have written a series of chapters: access to justice, the trial, 
evidence, the judge, the jury, judgment, litigation, and sentencing.
After years spent studying and teaching American law and legal theory, I 
understood at some point that Europeans and Americans think we are speaking of the 
same things when we talk, for example, about the trial and le procès, or the judicial 
opinion and le jugement, but in fact we’re not: the cultural matrix of the words we’re 
using is so different that we’re often misunderstanding each other.  This book is a modest 
effort of bringing the cultural presuppositions of each legal and judicial tradition to light, 
so that we fully understand not only our differences, but also our common references as 
parts of the Western world.  To that effect, we mobilized legal knowledge, of course, but 
also anthropology, religion, political philosophy, and sociology.
I would like to give a bird’s-eye view of some of the topics that are treated in the 
book, before I conclude by some more general comparative remarks on the common law 
and the Romanist legal systems.
Let me start by a topic that usually excites much academic passion and debate 
whenever we speak to our Anglophone friends, namely evidence (in French la preuve = 
proof).  This, of course, is a central point in every legal system, since it has to do with its 
conception and research of truth.  Evidence is situated in the articulation between law and 
fact, in the frontiers of a legal order, where abstract legal rules have to apprehend life 
2itself, to give it form and meaning.  No doubt that is why the cultural differences between 
us manifest themselves so clearly in this area of the law.  To put it schematically in one 
phrase, the Romanist legal culture seeks the substance of truth by trying to establish an 
official narrative through the rendering of a judgment by a judge who is seen as a 
“minister of truth”, whereas the common law legal culture is more interested in 
procedure; it organizes the public confrontation of two versions of the truth in order to 
make the most truthful narrative triumph.  In the book, we try to show that these two 
different conceptions of truth-seeking (and, we could add, of error-minimizing) that we
call, rather imaginatively, “inquisition” (for France) and “proceduralization” (for the US), 
have to do with the differences in the management of truth between Catholicism and 
Protestantism.
Let us consider one – but very important and rarely developed in the Continental 
legal literature – illustration of this by mentioning the example of the standards of proof.   
As is well-known, there is, in the common law context, a variation of the regimes of truth 
between basically three standards of proof, whereas in the Continent, there is a unique 
standard for ascertaining judicial truth (in the French context, this takes the name of 
intime conviction = intimate conviction of the judge).  In the US, legal practices model 
the truth according to the pragmatic context of its enunciation and the different functions 
assumed by justice.  Thus, we can observe a highly proceduralized administration of 
proof in order to fairly allocate the risks stemming from judicial action and to adapt the 
procedural tools of the legal system to the complexity of real life, by taking also into 
account the political morality underlying the different legal domains (that is obvious, for 
example, in the insistence on the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in the specific 
criminal law context).  The result, as we can see from the famous O.J. Simpson case (who 
was acquitted in criminal court but found liable in civil court), is sometimes the variation 
of judicial truth according to the context – civil or criminal – inside which it is sought.
This is intellectual heresy for France.  Of course, the ideal of truth remains the 
same in both legal cultures, but the means of producing truth (which we believe is one of 
the two main attributes of a legal culture, together with the ways of organizing the 
political sphere) are very different.  In the Roman-Catholic tradition, the truth cannot but 
be unique, one and indivisible.  Even if the judicial truth can be established by all means 
3and free evaluation or, on the contrary, is the fruit of legal presumptions, even if the legal 
consequences of the ascertainment of a fact vary in different procedural contexts, truth 
still is one and only one.  By analogy, truth is conceived of in the same way as the 
medieval scholastic philosophers like Thomas Aquinas, who thought that truth is the 
adequatio intellectus et rei (the concordance between intellect and thing).  The judge in 
the Continental context has assumed the sacerdotal function of the “minister of truth” 
after the abolition of the ordeal (role which is assumed by the jury in the common law 
world); he needs to establish, at a certain point, the unique and uncontestable truth by a 
shortcut such as his “intimate conviction”, that serves to put a halt on the concrete 
evaluation and balancing of the antagonistic interests and of the risks of error at stake.  
One of the conclusions of this book is that the common law legal culture insists a lot on 
the importance of procedure, of “axiological fidelity” to regular ways of behavior by 
legal practitioners, which are seen as a warranty for “truth”. That is, of course, an idea 
developed by one great American legal philosopher, the late Professor Lon Fuller, and 
systematized by one of his disciples, Professor Robert Summers.
Now let us consider a second example, that of the judgment (in French, le 
jugement).  It suffices a naked-eye comparison of, say, a decision by the US Supreme 
Court with a judgment by the Cour de cassation, the French supreme civil and criminal 
court, to see the enormous differences separating them.  These two legal texts have 
almost nothing in common: not the same speaker, not the same length, not the same form, 
and finally, not the same function.  To put it in a few words, a typical French judgment 
takes the form of a syllogism, a deductive or even mechanical reasoning written in an 
impersonal per curiam way, that limits itself to subsuming the facts of the case under a 
legal rule in order to infer a conclusion.  The famous “arrêt à phrase unique” (judgment 
in one unique phrase) of the Cour de cassation is not just a matter of style: the concision –
one could even say the hermetic character – of the French judgment reflects its 
intermediate position between the statute, sole source of the law, and the parties.  This 
style of judicial writing undoubtedly expresses the belief that it is the statute that breeds, 
in a quasi-mathematical way, the necessary judicial solution.  Professor Mitchell Lasser 
has written extensively on the peculiarities of the French judicial style.  The image of 
justice that transpires from this type of judgment is, of course, that of a univocal text, a 
4sort of scriptural reflection of the written and codified law’s sovereignty.  Because the 
supremacy of written and rationally structured law suffers no criticism, the logical chain 
going from the legislative dispositions to the decision that resolves the dispute must not 
be interrupted.  That is how the written law will shine in all its brilliance in the four 
corners of the territory.  Thus, the writing of judgments expresses what we can call a 
“political geometry”: the judgment in one unique phrase is the linear figuration linking 
directly the apex of the normative pyramid (the statute) to the basis (the controversy).  In 
fact, the French judge does not speak: he brings together the facts of a judicial species 
with the normative statement contained in nuce in the statute.
On the contrary, the common law judge writes opinions, not syllogistic 
reasonings.  In his legal culture, he is not a mathematician, but a narrator of the law.  The 
prestige he enjoys in his professional milieu imposes to him to fully and openly assume 
his own interpretation of the law and to render it in an argumentation written in the first 
person of the plural (when he writes for the majority) or of the singular (when he writes 
for the minority).  For that purpose, he signs generally long and fully reasoned and 
documented opinions (aided by his clerks, who do not exist in France).  Thus, instead of a 
hierarchical image of the law, a pyramid inside which the judge enters only to make 
transparent the intention of the legislator, the common law creates a horizontal linguistic 
community, that of the “peers” who read and use opinions, and of course constantly put 
them to the test of criticism.  The difference does not reside in the form or the length 
itself of judicial decisions; it resides in their different discursive status.  To resume in one 
phrase, I find that the common law judicial opinion is a narrative and an agon (Greek 
word meaning the competition of public speech).
I think – and try to show extensively in the book – that two are the main reasons 
justifying this exhaustive and ambitious judicial reasoning in the Anglo-American 
context: the duality between judge and jury, and the existence, as an immanent feature of 
the judgment, of the dissenting opinion (both inexistent in the French context). It is 
because the great weight of fact-finding and the verdict is assumed not by the judge but 
by the jury in a non-reasoned way (in that sense, the jury is the “black box” of the law) 
that the judge has to compensate by making a very elaborate reasoning and addressing it 
to the public opinion.  In other words, we can observe a sort of equilibrium between the 
5enlightened reasoning of the judge and the intuitive decisionism of the jury.  Inside the 
judgment itself, the quest of transparency and accountability – both structural features of 
the Anglo-American political liberalism –, but also the respect for the dissent, the 
opposition to the power of the state, from the inception of the common law that I find in 
the famous Prohibitions del Roy formulated by Lord Coke in 1612, result in the intrinsic 
importance of the dissenting opinions.
We might now proceed to some concluding remarks.  Each legal culture has some 
parameters that all together form its cultural matrix, a sort of grammar of the legal system 
that gives to legal practitioners more a manner of conceiving problems and doing things 
than a substantial content itself.  On p. 308 of the book we have tried to formalize this 
basic grammar of each of the two great western legal cultures, civil law and common law
thus:
Civil law Common law
Law coming upwards Law coming bottom-up
Centrality Decentralization
Verticality Horizontality
Unique character of the truth Competition between narratives
Integration from the inside Division
Distrust towards persons Confidence in actors
Passivity of the parties Autonomy and action of the parties
Substantive law Procedure
Preexisting law Preexisting social relations
Commandment by the law Social regularity
Unconditioned power Conditioned power
Institution Autonomy of the society vis-à-vis the law
As previously mentioned, one is not to deduce the content of the law from these 
basic cultural parameters, but to measure instead the fundamental attitudes that these 
parameters determine behind the legal discourse and practice, without necessarily the 
legal actors’ being conscious or articulate about it.  So let us resume some of the main 
cultural differences between the two great legal cultures.
6The common law is a legal culture that, in order to produce truth, spontaneously 
organizes a competition of narratives in the form of adversarial battles between lawyers.  
Instead of attacking head-on the problem of “truth”, the common law culture prefers to 
evacuate, to turn around the substantive moral problems by constantly proceduralizing 
them.  This is obvious, for example, in the context of the death penalty in the United 
States.  It is a culture of “one step at a time”, of a gradual and prudent progression 
towards a “truth” that can be cognizable and acceptable by the community of jurists.  Of 
course, this means an extraordinary spending of energy in motions, pleadings, and other 
procedural devices that can become counterproductive.  On the contrary, the French legal 
culture is characterized by an intensely republican political philosophy since the French 
Revolution; according to the revolutionary project, the formalization of the truth is made 
through the structuring ab initio of an official narrative by the investigating magistrate, 
aided in his task by experts, and by integrating this narrative into a public discourse, a 
legal discourse that constantly and obsessively refers to the public interest.  No doubt that 
is the case because the French legal culture is a profoundly political one.  That is why the 
truly legitimate legal actors are, in the Anglo-American system, the individuals 
themselves, whereas in the French system, the State.
Besides, the French legal culture is “legicentric” (centered around statutes and, 
more generally, the supremacy of written law), whereas for the common law legal 
culture, the law can ideally be found in the regularity of social practices.  Anglo-
American judicial practices are to a large extent reflexive: as is shown by the rule of stare 
decisis, the law is an interpretative practice that unfolds itself around the axis of 
practitioners’ arguments.  The American judicial truth presents itself at the same time as a 
response to questions asked from the inside of a social practice, and as a great narrative 
transcending the closed world of the law by addressing the citizens themselves, by 
celebrating the political morality of the American people and reminding from time to 
time the basic constitutional values everyone adheres to.
Another feature that is extremely interesting to us Continentals is that the 
common law legal culture seems to be stimulated by divisions of all sorts.  Historical 
tension between the rules of common law and equity, tension – arising sometimes even to 
secession – between the majority and the minority judicial opinions, shared roles between 
7the judge and the jury, and so on.  It seems that this constant tension is the resort of the 
extraordinary vitality of the common law, the reason for the stimulation of its creativity 
and of its profound dynamism.  The French legal culture, on the other hand, is very afraid 
of anything that resembles division, so it generally chooses functional doubling by 
concentrating in the same persons two different – or even contradictory – legal tasks.  
That is why the French Conseil d’Etat (Council of State = the supreme administrative 
court) is at the same time counsel and judge of the government, the juge d’instruction 
(investigating magistrate) is at the same time investigator and decisionmaker, and the 
juge pour enfants (juvenile judge) takes at the same time protective and repressive 
measures.  Finally, to give one last illustration of the basic cultural differences that has to 
do with legal globalization, the French tend to conceive of universality as a direct address 
to the world, by transposing purely and simply the abstract and idealistic language of 
human rights to the international legal fora.  The American judicial culture, on the other 
hand, depends largely on a capricious, erratic, and above all, local institution, namely the 
jury, to regulate even international transactions: thus, the decision of a Houston, Texas 
jury in 2002 signed the warrant of one of the world’s biggest multinational firms, Arthur 
Andersen.
